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JUSTICE STEVENS AND 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF JUDGMENT 
David E. Pozen* 
How to sum up a corpus of opinions that spans dozens of legal 
fields and four decades on the bench? How to make the most sense 
of a jurisprudence that has always been resistant to classification, by 
a jurist widely believed to have “no discernible judicial 
philosophy”?1 These questions have stirred Justice Stevens’ former 
clerks in recent months. Since his retirement, many of us have been 
trying to capture in some meaningful if partial way what we found 
vital and praiseworthy in his approach to the law.2 There may be 
something paradoxical about the attempt to encapsulate in a formula 
the views of someone who was so sensitive to the potential tyranny 
of labels, to taxonomize the output of someone so skeptical about 
neat legal categories. There is certainly something reductive about it. 
Be that as it may, I will try in these pages to contribute to the effort 
by suggesting that an important clue to Justice Stevens’ 
jurisprudence can be found in his frequent recourse to the notion of 
judicial “judgment.” If one word must be selected to illuminate a 
life’s work, this would be my submission. 
 
*  *  * 
 
I do not have the space here to make good on this claim in any 
robust way, but I believe the record would demonstrate that, to a 
degree unmatched by his colleagues, Justice Stevens tended to draw 
 
 * Special Advisor to the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State; J.D., Yale Law School. 
The author served as a law clerk to the Hon. John Paul Stevens during the 2009 Supreme Court 
Term. The views expressed herein are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views 
of the Department of State or the United States Government. 
 1. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 346 (2008) (describing Justice Stevens). 
Judge Posner further characterizes Stevens as “leaning toward pragmatism.” Id. 
 2. See, e.g., Symposium, The Honorable John Paul Stevens, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 713 
(2010); Symposium, “The Finest Legal Mind”: A Symposium in Celebration of Justice John Paul 
Stevens, 99 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2011). 
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on—and draw attention to—the idea of judicial judgment. He did 
this in three main contexts. 
First, Justice Stevens consistently tempered his separate 
writings, including nearly all of his most ambitious ones, with the 
qualifier “in my judgment.”3 Thus, in the first paragraph of his 
opinion in Citizens United v. FEC4 and in the last paragraph of his 
opinion in Davis v. FEC,5 Justice Stevens explained that the 
majority’s approach to campaign finance regulation was, “in [his] 
judgment,” deeply flawed. His vigorous dissents in California 
Democratic Party v. Jones6 and United States v. Booker7 similarly 
moderated with this phrase the charge that the Court was doing 
something unprecedented and unwarranted. Such ritualistic 
references to one’s own “judgment” are hardly earth-shattering. But 
they bespeak a sense of humility and personal responsibility that is 
sometimes missing from the justices’ pronouncements, as well as a 
level of comfort with the existence of disagreement. They provide a 
diplomatic counterweight to the exceptionally candid and, often, 
stinging appraisals that follow—the handshake before the duel. 
 Second, Justice Stevens consistently called on judges to exercise 
independent judgment in the face of constrictive standards of review. 
Throughout his tenure, he challenged the Court’s “rigid adherence to 
tiers of scrutiny” in equal protection analysis.8 He opposed the line of 
decisions that progressively narrowed the appellate courts’ power 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) to recognize “plain” 
errors not timely raised in district court, so as to protect a defendant’s 
 
 3. This was not an ironclad rule. Justice Stevens’ Bush v. Gore dissent notably used no 
such qualifiers in excoriating the majority for the “certain” damage it had done to “the Nation’s 
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.” 531 U.S. 98, 128–29 (2000) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 4. 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 
also id. at 961 (“[T]he approach [to Congress’s anticorruption interest] taken by the majority 
cannot be right, in my judgment.”). 
 5. 554 U.S. 724, 757 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 6. 530 U.S. 567, 590 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s holding is novel and, in 
my judgment, plainly wrong.”). 
 7. 543 U.S. 220, 274 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“In my judgment, it is 
therefore clear that the Court’s creative remedy is an exercise of legislative, rather than judicial, 
power.”). 
 8. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 800–01 
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451–54 
(1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–14 (1976) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
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“substantial rights.”9 And with particular zeal, he resisted the Court’s 
winnowing of its own habeas authority under the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).10 No one doubts that 
AEDPA limited federal court review of state habeas petitions in a 
variety of respects, further diminishing inmates’ prospects for 
relief.11 But just how severely AEDPA limited the substantive 
dimension of federal court review quickly proved controversial. In 
Williams v. Taylor,12 Justice Stevens staked out a minimalist vision 
of what AEDPA had changed. “Whatever ‘deference’ Congress had 
in mind” in crafting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), he wrote for a plurality, “it 
surely is not a requirement that federal courts actually defer to a 
state-court application of the federal law that is, in the independent 
judgment of the federal court, in error.”13 
That “surely” seems an immoderate touch. Yet were things 
otherwise, Justice Stevens insisted, both the longstanding role of the 
federal courts in considering habeas claims and the uniformity of 
federal law could be compromised.14 To avert these perceived harms, 
he posited something like a clear statement rule, requiring Congress 
to express its intent “with much greater clarity” if it wishes to disable 
federal judges from drawing and enforcing their own legal 
conclusions.15 
The debate over AEDPA is not merely technical in nature for 
Justice Stevens, then, because in his view the extreme subordination 
of a federal court’s legal analysis to the analysis of the state court, in 
a context such as habeas, risks nothing less than a subversion of the 
 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2167–69 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 743–45 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 10.  Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 
42 U.S.C.). 
 11. See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State 
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 812 n.74 (2009) (summarizing AEDPA’s key 
“innovations”). 
 12. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 13. Id. at 387 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
 14. Id. at 386–90. 
 15. Id. at 379; see also Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1876 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Any attempt to prevent federal courts from exercising independent review of habeas 
applications would have been a radical reform of dubious constitutionality, and Congress ‘would 
have spoken with much greater clarity’ if that had been its intent.” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000))); In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1–2 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(suggesting AEDPA applies with lesser force, if at all, to “actual innocence” claims and to 
original habeas petitions filed initially in Supreme Court). 
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judicial role. On issues of federal law, state judges are supposed to 
take their cues from Article III judges, not the other way around.16 
An excessively deferential approach also invites logical confusion, 
because the determination whether any given state court adjudication 
was “unreasonable” under AEDPA necessarily entails an assessment 
of what that court has done; the reasonableness of a ruling is 
inextricably bound up with its correctness. No matter how rigidly 
one interprets § 2254(d) or any other legal standard, Justice Stevens 
reminded his colleagues this past Term, “there is no escaping the 
burden of judgment.”17 
 Finally, and most pointedly, Justice Stevens consistently 
affirmed the value of judicial judgment in construing the 
Constitution’s most expansively worded provisions and the Court’s 
only slightly less open-ended implementing standards. The First 
Amendment was an early target. In his 1984 opinion for the Court in 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,18 for instance, 
Justice Stevens admonished the courts of appeals to exercise 
“independent judgment” in deciding whether particular speech acts 
lose protection as “fighting words,” incitements to imminent 
lawlessness, obscenity, child pornography, or libel.19 Lest future 
appellate judges be tempted to shirk this duty or to underestimate its 
discretionary aspect, Stevens declared boldly, if cryptically, that 
“[t]he requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law.”20 
 Justice Stevens elaborated on the imperative of judgment in 
greater depth in his Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The central 
statement appears in his 2008 Baze v. Rees21 concurrence, the opinion 
that signaled his willingness to find the death penalty 
 
 16. Justice Stevens was equally vigilant about maintaining the reverse hierarchy, respecting 
the interpretive supremacy of state judges on issues of state law. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032, 1065–72 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating presumption against federal 
jurisdiction in cases resolved on adequate state grounds). 
 17. Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1876 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 54–58 (1993) (describing “burdens of judgment” that give rise to reasonable 
disagreement about matters of value in democratic societies). The burdens of judgment identified 
by Rawls exacerbate the judge’s burden of judgment invoked by Stevens, by making it virtually 
inevitable that certain judicial decisions—decisions that touch on important issues of morality or 
justice—will engender dissensus among reasonable persons. 
 18. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). 
 19. Id. at 505–11 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
 20. Id. at 510. 
 21. 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
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unconstitutional. Defending a line of cases in which the Court had 
struck down state practices as “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth 
Amendment, Stevens explained that “[i]n those opinions we 
acknowledged that ‘objective evidence, though of great importance, 
did not “wholly determine” the controversy, “for the Constitution 
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to 
bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under 
the Eighth Amendment.”’”22 He associated himself with Justice 
White, who “was exercising his own judgment in 1972 when he 
provided the decisive vote in Furman, the case that led to a 
nationwide reexamination of the death penalty.”23 “As a matter of 
fact,” Justice Stevens observed, Justice White had no choice but to 
“arrive at judgment,” for “there are occasions when a Member of this 
Court has a duty to make judgments on the basis of data that falls 
short of absolute proof.”24 
 This sentiment found its fullest expression in Justice Stevens’ 
writings on substantive due process, culminating in the final dissent 
of his career in McDonald v. City of Chicago.25 In that opinion, 
Stevens identified heavily with the second Justice Harlan, and took 
as a touchstone his predecessor’s observation that “[n]o formula 
could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.”26 
He emphasized at several points, in outlining his views on how a 
judge should approach substantive due process analysis, both the 
constraining force and the affirmative virtue of “reasoned 
judgment.”27 And in his valedictory exchange with Justice Scalia, he 
upbraided his colleague for making a quixotic attempt to escape from 
 
 22. Id. at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
312 (2002)) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 83–84 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., 
concurring)). In a series of opinions whittling away at the margins of capital punishment, Justice 
Kennedy has endorsed a similar understanding of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
 25. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 26. Id. at 3102 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). The affinities with Harlan transcend this one area. In his commitment to 
reasoned elaboration of the law, his interpretive purposivism, his common-law orientation, and 
his concern for the optimal allocation of decision-making authority across institutions, Justice 
Stevens carried on a number of the legal process school values that Justice Harlan is often seen as 
having “personified.” Donald A. Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal Procedure: Two Cheers for 
the Legal Process School, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 125, 132 (2005). 
 27. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3096, 3099 n.22, 3100, 3119 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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judgment through an exclusively historicized methodology.28 
Whether or not the Court’s substantive due process decisions 
facilitate or frustrate democratic values, Justice Stevens concluded, 
“all depends on judges’ exercising careful, reasoned judgment. As it 
always has, and as it always will.”29 
 
*  *  * 
 
 So what insight into Justice Stevens can we derive from these 
observations? To be sure, a judge’s use of a term as common as 
“judgment” is not, on its face, all that striking; Justice Breyer’s 
penchant for invoking “workability” as a constitutional norm 
certainly invites greater scrutiny and contributes more self-
consciously to his particular brand of pragmatism.30 Yet, especially 
in an age when younger liberal justices are content to stand on 
technocratic ideals such as workability, the significance of Justice 
Stevens’ insistence on judgment cannot be discounted.31 I believe his 
repeated foregrounding of the term, his thematization of judgment, 
sheds light on at least three notable aspects of his jurisprudence. 
 First, it illuminates the faith Justice Stevens places in the 
capacity of practical reason to broker between illegitimate subjective 
preferences and infeasible objective standards. Wholly private beliefs 
have no place in judging, Justice Stevens would be the first to avow; 
as guides to judicial decision they are, almost by definition, arbitrary 
and capricious. Universally accepted principles could have a large 
place, except that in the legal culture we live in—marked by 
diversity and disagreement—and in the constitutional tradition we 
inhabit—marked by textual parsimony and linguistic plasticity—
such principles will rarely exist. So, in construing a phrase such as 
“cruel and unusual punishments” or “due process,” how does a judge 
set aside personal sentiment and remain faithful to the internal 
 
 28. Id. at 3116–19. 
 29. Id. at 3119. 
 30. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW, at xii 
(2010) (“In the framers’ eyes, then, the Court would help to maintain the workable democracy 
that the Constitution sought to create. . . . The present book focuses on the Supreme Court’s role 
in maintaining a workable constitutional system of government.”); see also David E. Pozen, Deep 
Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 303 & n.148 (2010) (noting Justice Breyer’s interest in ideal of 
“workability,” as evidenced by prior writings). 
 31. Thanks to Jeremy Kessler for discussion on this point. 
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perspective of the lawyer, while also doing justice to the interpretive 
license and freedom of action that those formulations allow? And 
how does a judge respect the fact of moral and political pluralism, 
while also fulfilling her duty to say what the law is without fear or 
favor? For Stevens, part of the answer lies in an analytic method that 
looks outward and forward as well as backward, assessing the 
relevant legal materials in light of the particular facts, underlying 
goals, and widely shared expectations that attend them. To avoid the 
twin shoals of willful and “wooden”32 decision-making, the judge 
must evaluate her options critically and pragmatically: she must 
“employ the distinctly human faculty of judgment.”33 Contextual 
values and case-specific variables stand in for abstract propositions 
and categorical truths. Practical reason guides the way. 
 This helps explain the purposivist streak in Justice Stevens’ 
jurisprudence, along with his skepticism of more formalistic models 
of interpretation that aspire principally to fetter judges or to identify 
“correct” answers.34 Those aspirations can never be fully realized, 
and in any event they may not be desirable. They would reduce 
judging to a kind of analytic puzzle, even though it inescapably 
involves the privileging of certain legal premises, historical 
perspectives, and social values over others, with profound 
consequences for us all. Thus, in District of Columbia v. Heller,35 a 
case that still rankles,36 when Justice Scalia summarily asserted that 
the rule of decision would be the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment,37 he moved too quickly for Stevens. He never addressed 
the logically prior question of why that should be the rule. Why not 
 
 32. The charge of “woodenness” was one of Justice Stevens’ signature rebukes. See, e.g., 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948, 979 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 800 
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 547 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 33. Neil S. Siegel, Prudentialism in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 16, 30 (2010) (limning connection between judicial discretion and judgment, with 
reference to Justice Stevens’ McDonald dissent). 
 34. In his contribution to this tribute issue, Bill Araiza insightfully explores Justice Stevens’ 
skepticism of rigid rules in the areas of equal protection and free speech. William D. Araiza, 
Justice Stevens and Constitutional Adjudication: The Law Beyond the Rules, 44 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 889 (2011). 
 35. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 36. See Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens: What Will the Supreme Court Be Like Without Its 
Liberal Leader?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 2010, at 38, 41 (quoting Justice Stevens listing Heller 
and Bush v. Gore as cases “I’m very unhappy with”). 
 37. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–77 (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
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look instead to stare decisis?38 Why not look to the ends the Second 
Amendment was meant to serve?39 To the basic needs and ideals of 
American communities today?40 Original meaning can never be 
ignored—certainly Justice Stevens’ opinion lavished attention on 
it41—but when judges like Scalia suggest that their hands are clean 
because they are just applying text or tradition or Founding-era 
understandings, they are being overly optimistic at best. They are 
wrongly denying to the public, and perhaps also to themselves, their 
own normativity. 
Judicial judgment is more than a decisional imperative on this 
account. It is an ethical obligation. To accept the role of judgment is 
to reckon both with the irreducible uncertainty of legal norms and 
with the judge’s power to do violence to the social fabric. Judgment 
entails a taking on of responsibility.42 
Second, Justice Stevens’ emphasis on judgment illuminates his 
faith in the capacity of reason-giving to mediate conflict and ensure 
the reasonableness of the Court’s decisions. As Justice Scalia has 
never tired of pointing out, there are obvious pitfalls to a 
jurisprudence that draws on uncodified intersubjective norms and 
that refuses to elevate any one interpretive modality above all others 
in a rigid hierarchy.43 In particular, there is potential for idiosyncratic 
and instrumental behavior. To ensure against such risks, Justice 
Stevens realized early on, something more than good faith may be 
needed. 
He therefore developed various tools of self-restraint. He 
avoided relying on deeply contested, high-level theories of the good 
 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Even if the textual and historical 
arguments on both sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of 
all of our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself, would prevent most jurists 
from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 643 (arguing that Second Amendment should be construed in light of “the 
clear statement of [militia-related] purpose announced in the Amendment’s preamble”). 
 40. See, e.g., id. at 689–723 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., 
dissenting) (advocating and applying “interest-balancing” approach to Second Amendment 
review that explicitly weighs current public interest in regulation). 
 41. Id. at 639–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 42. Efforts to escape from judgment, accordingly, may reflect not so much modesty as a 
kind of existentialist bad faith. Cf. POSNER, supra note 1, at 104 (arguing that originalists’ 
“pretense” to having prepolitical, value-neutral methodology is “an example of bad faith in 
Sartre’s sense—bad faith as the denial of freedom to choose, and so the shirking of personal 
responsibility”). 
 43. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050–58 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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or the right, drawing instead (when germane) on the common 
experiences and aspirations of the American people: although one 
virtually never found Justice Stevens appealing to any 
comprehensive moral or political doctrine, one would often find him 
appealing to the reader’s common sense, to canonical events in U.S. 
history, to the minimal demands of personal dignity and autonomy, 
or to basic notions of fair play.44 He favored case-specific rulings 
over broad pronouncements. And, especially pertinent here, he 
adhered to an ethic of strict transparency. Notwithstanding his genial, 
unassuming nature, Stevens distinguished himself from the start by 
his willingness to write separately, his insistence on explaining rather 
than asserting his positions, and his plainspoken, argumentative 
style. If he was not entirely happy with or convinced by what his 
colleagues were doing, he would say so. 
“Our practice of disclosing conflicting views,” Justice Stevens 
once wrote, “not only gives the public an opportunity to evaluate our 
work more intelligently,” thereby fostering dialogue and 
accountability, “but also reduces the danger that troublesome 
questions will be swept under the rug.”45 In this way, the 
transparency of one’s jurisprudence can serve as both an internal and 
external check on its normative aspect. Practical reason informs 
judicial judgment; public reasoning disciplines it. Judgment must be 
justified. 
 Finally, and implicit in the points above, Justice Stevens’ ideal 
of judgment illuminates his faith in the capacity of federal judges to 
apply their discretion in an appropriately lawful and democracy-
respecting manner. The prospect of federal judges exercising 
independent judgment never frightened Justice Stevens the way it 
has frightened some, because he never signed on to the premise that 
 
 44. In other words, Justice Stevens employed only what Lawrence Solum, building on John 
Rawls, has termed “public legal reasons”: reasons that draw on policies and principles accessible 
by, and potentially acceptable to, all reasonable citizens. Lawrence B. Solum, Public Legal 
Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. 1449 (2006); cf. Jeremy Waldron, Planning for Legality, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 883, 901 (2011) (book review) (discussing, in light of Scott Shapiro’s planning theory of 
law, virtue of judges’ favoring “strategies that give greater weight to values or modes of thinking 
that are already well established in society”). 
 45. Gregory P. Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens’s Free Speech 
Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2239 (2006) (quoting John Paul Stevens, What I Did 
This Summer, 18-OCT CBA REC., Oct. 2004, at 34, 34). 
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they are intrinsically threatening, or “deviant,”46 actors in a 
democratic polity. As Justice Brennan once observed, “[t]o Justice 
Stevens, we are all part of a vast web that includes present and future 
judges, practicing lawyers, academics, and the public, all engaged in 
the profoundly important task of self-governance through law.”47 The 
courts, on this view, do not stand outside of the processes of 
collective will-formation and self-determination; nor are Congress 
and the executive branch commensurate with “We the People.” If 
their presidential appointments and life tenure give federal judges a 
weaker popular pedigree as compared to their counterparts in the 
other branches, the former have compensating virtues borne of their 
structural independence, their critical distance from everyday 
politics, and their distinctive professional norms. 
The best judges, moreover, have earned the trust of the 
American people over time, through the cogency and integrity of the 
decisions they have rendered. When referencing an earlier Supreme 
Court opinion, Justice Stevens was uniquely likely to invoke its 
author by name. This habit served not only to establish continuity 
and remind readers that real human beings—persons with the 
capacity for reasoned judgment—invariably mold the law, but also to 
establish the significance of Supreme Court justices in the historical 
(and still unfolding) process of molding what this nation has become. 
These references served a legitimating function as well. Because the 
work of the Court, for Stevens, involves the application of judgment 
above and beyond the application of formal logic and legal craft, the 
fact that venerable jurists from decades past would have endorsed a 
proposition tends to confirm its validity.48 
None of this is to say that Justice Stevens’ faith in judges was 
naïve or without meaningful boundaries. To the contrary, he 
persistently noted the ways in which misplaced judicial interventions 
could circumscribe the domains of both individual and societal self-
governance. And to this end, he persistently inquired into which 
 
 46. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 18 (2d ed. 1986) (describing judicial review as “deviant institution” in 
American democracy). 
 47. Magarian, supra note 45, at 2239 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Tribute to Justice 
Stevens, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L., at xxi, xxiii). 
 48. At times, Justice Stevens’ transtemporal communion with his predecessors could verge 
on the uncanny. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 912 n.1 (1992) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that eleven of previous fifteen 
justices would have disagreed with dissent’s position). 
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institution would be best suited to address a particular question—an 
inquiry formalized in Chevron’s famous two-step test49—and 
contrasted judicial judgment with other forms of specialized 
reasoning, such as “legislative judgment,”50 “policy judgment,”51 and 
“professional judgment.”52 Each has its place in a democratic society. 
One of the judge’s tasks is to maintain a suitable allocation of 
decision-making authority across institutions.53 Deferring to the 
judgment of other bodies, in the right circumstances, ensures that 
judges remain faithful to their constitutional role and do not arrogate 
to themselves outsized significance in resolving value-laden 
questions. Failing to acknowledge or employ judicial judgment on an 
appropriate matter, on the other hand, advances no such goods. It 
simply reflects a failure to come to terms with one’s own freedom 
and responsibility, and therefore a failure of moral seriousness. 
 
*  *  * 
 
 The Supreme Court justice wields awesome discretionary power 
to shape the law, giving rise to an equally awesome burden of 
judgment. Justice Stevens felt this burden keenly and grappled with 
 
 49. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984) 
(opinion of Stevens, J.); id. at 864–66 (contrasting policymaking expertise and mandate of 
political branches with competencies and duties of courts); see also supra note 26 (noting Justice 
Stevens’ adherence to certain legal process school values). 
 50. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480, 482 (2005) (opinion of 
Stevens, J.); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144, 205 (2003) (joint opinion of Stevens and 
O’Connor, JJ.). 
 51. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (opinion of Stevens, J.); 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005) (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
 52. See, e.g., Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 130 (1997) (opinion of Stevens, J.); Regents 
of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
 53. This inquiry could be rather nuanced, because in addition to considering whether another 
institution has generic advantages over the courts in a certain area, Justice Stevens was willing to 
consider the manner in which that institution applied its judgment to a given case. See, e.g., Doe 
v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2830 n.3 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (“The degree to which we defer to a judgment by the political branches must vary up 
and down with the degree to which that judgment reflects considered, public-minded decision 
making. Thus, when a law appears to have been adopted without reasoned consideration, for 
discriminatory purposes, or to entrench political majorities, we are less willing to defer to the 
institutional strengths of the legislature.” (internal citations omitted)). In this vein, one wonders 
whether some part of Justice Stevens’ reluctance to defer to state courts on habeas claims, see 
supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text, reflected his deep concern about the influence of 
judicial elections on those courts’ treatment of criminal defendants. See John Paul Stevens, 
Opening Assembly Address, American Bar Association Annual Meeting, Orlando, Florida, Aug. 
3, 1996, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 21, 30–31 (1996). 
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it forthrightly throughout his career. Because Justice Stevens never 
committed to any distinct brand of jurisprudence or theory of the 
judicial role, his place in history will have to rest on an evaluation of 
how he applied his judgment in scores upon scores of individual 
cases—whether he did so fairly and wisely, or unsatisfyingly and 
imprudently, whether his decisions advanced or arrested the cause of 
legality, liberty, and justice. He wouldn’t have it any other way. 
